Friday, December 3, 2010

Eight Air-Security Myths

I wrote about the absurdity that is the TSA current 'security' procedures at American airports the other day. You did read it, didn't you? No? Go here.

I am under no delusions that any of the DHS or TSA officials will take any notice of my comments or helpful suggestions, but came across another column whose writer may have more credibility within the US. John C. Wohlstetter is a senior fellow at the Discovery Institute, a trustee of the Hudson Institute, author of The Long War Ahead and the Short War Upon Us, and founder of the blog Letter From the Capitol. Read on:
John C. Wohlstetter Eight Air-Security Myths

Why the TSA’s new policies won’t make us safer.

Two solid analysts, ex–Bush 43 speechwriter Marc Thiessen and Hudson Institute intelligence scholar Gabriel Schoenfeld, have published defenses of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) controversial new scanning and patdown policies. They argue that TSA’s policy is a necessary reaction to the evolution of terrorism. Their analysis rests on eight air-security myths.

1. The fact that there have been no attacks since 9/11 vindicates TSA.

The logical fallacy here is known as post hoc, ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore on account of this”). There is zero reason to credit TSA’s new tactics with anything save annoying unlucky travelers. We can see this by looking at incidents in which governments actually foiled terror plots. None of them involved TSA-style measures.

Remember the 2006 ten-jetliner plot hatched at Heathrow? The 1995 “Bojinka” terror plot hatched by 1993 World Trade Center–bombing mastermind Ramzi Youssef? The 2006 plot was broken up by the Brits, and the Filipinos broke up the second. Neither used TSA’s methods. The Brits used shoe-leather investigating, phone taps, and intelligence from a Pakistani interrogation of one detainee. And in 1995, Youssef was interrogated by the Philippine government, and confessed.

No other government uses the TSA scanners. No one — including the Israelis — uses intimate patdowns.

2. The Christmas Bomber’s near-success requires scans.

The underwear bomber who nearly ruined America’s 2009 Christmas flying season used PETN, an explosive that is difficult to detect even with the new scanning machines. (So are twelve-inch razor blades, apparently.) What was easily detectable by the U.S. was the bomber’s dad’s visiting our embassy in Lagos, Nigeria, and warning us about his son — several times. Israeli experts tell us that most of their security is applied before a traveler reaches the airport. Kids and lawmakers likely do not get stuck on Israeli no-fly lists.

3. Each method terrorists use requires a targeted response.

Because terrorists have hidden stuff in their underwear, we must pat them down. So when terrorists use body cavities to conceal things, as surely they will, will TSA attempt to search everyone’s orifices? Not a chance: Americans will not stand for anything like this. Which is why the excuses for today’s patdown molestations are so infuriating and phony.

We need to catch people before they bring down planes. But we do not do this by making flying, already a grim business since 9/11, a humiliating ordeal. Making travelers cringe gives terrorists a victory even without bringing a plane down...

Wohlstetter has more rebuttals, set out in clear, concise language that even a moron could follow (Hello? TSA? Janet? Anyone?) Go here to read it ALL.

Pay attention, America!

(H/T Mark R. Taylor)

No comments: